炮戰後Startfor(數位地圖)的分析:許多新聞媒體根據它的分析大作文章...
北朝鮮用的是多管火箭(MRL),類似BF-21,放了炮後逃之夭夭,大約佈署6輛火箭炮.
南朝鮮有6門155mm火炮佈署在島上,其中2門155mm火炮在南方島上訓練中,事實上只有4門參于戰火,其中一門炮火中受損,所以戰鬥力只剩一半....
炮兵軍友,趕緊出來討論.
Analysis
In the past week, additional tactical details have emerged about the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island by North Korean artillery. In addition, a satellite imagery package provided to STRATFOR by DigitalGlobe offers further perspective on North Korean military activity in the buildup to the event.
South Korea has claimed that it detected the movement of at least an entire battalion of 122 mm multiple rocket launchers (MRL) into position prior to the shelling. Under Soviet organization, a BM-21 Grad battalion consists of 18 fire units organized into three batteries of six launchers apiece. Each launch vehicle carries 40 launch tubes divided into four rows of 10. North Korea operates direct copies of the BM-21 as well as another variant, the BM-11, which generally uses the same (but locally manufactured) Russian Ural-375D 6x6 chassis but mounts two sets of 15 tubes side-by-side. Attached satellite imagery shows four different prepared battery firing positions near Kaemori, including at least one that appears to have been targeted by counterbattery fire.
Timeline of the Shelling
This battalion of MRLs, deployed to the area from the North Korean 4th Army Corps, played the primary role in the shelling, not the coastal artillery position already stationed in Kaemori. The barrage of artillery rockets began at 2:34 p.m. local time and lasted for more than 20 minutes. The initial barrage consisted of 150 rounds, followed by 20 more intermittently — meaning that while a full battalion appeared to be in position, a fully armed single battery could have conducted the entire attack. Of these 170 rounds, 80 struck Yeonpyeong Island, though 20 failed to detonate.
Satellite Imagery: Tactical Details of the Korean Artillery Exchange
The initial barrage was reportedly a coordinated time-on-target strike, which would mean that the rounds were fired in such a way as to attempt to achieve simultaneous impact. This tactic, achieved by lofting earlier rounds on less-efficient trajectories, does not necessarily require particularly modern equipment, but it does require well-drilled gun crews, decently maintained equipment and competent fire direction control personnel to calculate the fire mission. It is not clear what the North Koreans were attempting to achieve or how many guns were involved, but time-on-target is a useful tactic to attempt to lessen the time South Korea has to react to the strike — though an alert counterbattery radar would spot the first rounds — and the North had experimented with it in a January live-fire drill from coastal positions near the Northern Limit Line.
Additionally, the rounds appear to have been incendiary or perhaps even thermobaric, with the intention of starting fires. Given the murky nature of North Korea’s order of battle and the rockets’ domestic manufacture, the exact type of round is not known. With a few modern exceptions, artillery rockets are unguided and achieve results through massed fires rather than exceptional accuracy. Here, North Korea had no opportunity to register targets or adjust fire based on input from forward observers; South Korea has subsequently conjectured based on the targets that the North’s maps of military positions on the island may have been dated. The failure of so many rounds to reach the island and a dud rate of roughly a quarter of those that did suggest issues of quality control in manufacture and/or poorly controlled storage, as well as the potential for there to have been issues in the fire direction or on the gunline.
South Korea began to return fire at 2:47 p.m., minutes before the initial North Korean barrage ended. A battery of six K9 155 mm self-propelled howitzers, which was conducting live-fire drills on a Yeonpyeong Island military base, fired some 80 rounds. Two of the six guns were down at the time the North Korean barrage began and were oriented to the south for training, and the initial targets of the active guns reportedly were existing emplacements, not the new positions near Kaemori. It is not clear whether South Korean counterbattery fire was sufficiently timely to be at all effective — it is common practice for both mortars and artillery to displace rapidly after firing when there is a counterbattery threat. The exchange of fire continued from 3:10 p.m. to 3:41 p.m., and South Korean F-15K fighters were scrambled. Two South Korean soldiers and two civilians were ultimately killed in the exchange.
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